'Literal/ Golden/ Mischief Rules Essay\r'

'The literal run is the primary regain which make fors precedence over the others. spoken communication and phrases should be construed by the courts in their cut-and-dried sense, and the mine run predominates of grammar and punctuation should be applied. If, applying this rule, a distinctly importation appears, then this moldiness be applied, and the courts will non inquire whether what the edict says represents the pattern of the legislature: ‘The intention of fantan is not to be judged by what is in its mind, but by the expression of that mind in the statute itself’. The literal rule is strongly criticised by galore(postnominal) honoryers. It has been said to be ‘….a rule against victimisation intelligence in netherstanding language. Anyone who in ordinary life see words literally, being soggy to what the speaker or writer meant, would be regarded as a pedant, a mischief-maker or an cretin’.\r\nSuch criticism, it is submitted, is m isguided. For example, the Hotel Proprietors form 1956 provides that in certain circumstances an hotel proprietor is liable for loss of or injury to guests’ blank space, but that this liability does not usually fly the coop to guests’ motor vehicles or property remaining ‘ in this’. The question arises †is the hotel proprietor liable for property left on, rather than in, a vehicle, for example, on a pileus rack. On a literal fancyation, the hotel proprietor is liable, because if Parlia custodyt had intend to exclude property left on a vehicle, the performance would have said ‘thitherin or thereon’. The ‘common-sense’ school would say that it is ludicrous to make a distinction between property left in or on a vehicle.\r\nThat may be so in the avowedly trivial example given, but if this line of aim is accepted, it way of life that the courts would have power to rewrite get alongs of Parlia manpowert, which many state would consider to be highly dangerous, curiously where it takes the form of assuming that Parliament ‘intended’ something, when in truth it is more than likely that Parliament never gave that guinea pig a moments’ thought. It is better that the courts interpret statutes strictly, and if this leads to unacceptable or inequitable results, then Parliament should conduce amending economy to indicate clearly what its intention was. The copious force of the literal rule was demonstrated in the case of Whitely v, Chappell (1869). The defendant had suffraged in the name of a individual who had died, but was found not unrighteous of the offence of someoneating ‘any psyche authorize to vote’: a dead person is not empower to vote.\r\nGolden Rule\r\nWhere the meaning of words in a statute, if strictly applied, would lead to an absurdity, the golden rule is that the courts are entitled to assume that Parliament did not intend much(prenominal) a bsurdity, and they will construe the Act to give it the meaning which Parliament intended. So, for example, the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 provided that ‘whosoever being married shall link another person during the life of the former husband or wife’ is guilty of bigamy. Re Sigsworth 1935 provided that the Defendant was not entitled to inherit because it would be manifestly repugnant to throw overboard a murderer to reap the benefit of his shame even if the Defendant is the only inheritor.\r\nInterpreted literally, this rendering is absurd on two counts. First, the phrase ‘shall conjoin another person’ is meaningless in the context, as the essence of bigamy is that a married person skunknot marry again while his first trade union subsists. Secondly, the computer address to a ‘former’ husband or wife is quite inappropriate. The word ‘former’ suggests that the original marriage no longer exists, but if that were t he case the person marrying again would not be guilty of bigamy. disdain the slipshod draftsmanship of the Act, however, the intention was clear, and the courts have interpreted the relevant section as meaning that a person who purports to marry another while his or wife or husband is still subsisting is guilty of bigamy.\r\nMischief Rule\r\nWhen it is not clear whether an act falls within what is prohibited by a particular piece of legislation, the judges fuck apply the mischief rule. This means that the courts can take into account the reasons why the legislation was passed; what ‘mischief’ the legislation was designed to cure, and whether the act in question throw away within the ‘mischief’. For example, the Street Offences Act 1959 make it an offence for a prostitute to solicit men ‘in a street or semipublic place’. In Smith v. Hughes the question was whether a woman who had tapped on a balcony and hissed at men passing by was guilty o f an offence under the Act. Parker, L.C.J., found her guilty: ‘I approach the matter by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody (sic) knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes.\r\nViewed in that way, it can matter piffling whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or standing in a doorway or on a balcony’. In the case mentioned, it was comparatively easy to apply the mischief rule as the circumstances which caused the passing of the Act were well known. The rule does, however, have limitations as it is by no means perpetually easy to discover the ‘mischief’ at which particular Act was aimed. The rules of interpretation discussed above do not apply to the interpretation of EEC legislation.\r\nThe European Communities Act 1972 provides that questions of interpretation of EEC law must be decided in ac cordance with the principles rigid down by any relevant decision of the European Court. Therefore, although EEC legislation has the force of law in England and thus becomes part of English law, the courts cannot interpret it by the methods which they apply to the main body of English law. In interpreting statutes, the courts make certain presumptions: (a) that the statute is not intended to have retrospective subject; (b) that it applies only to the United Kingdom;\r\n(c) that it is not intended to interfere with existing vested rights; (d) that the property of any person will not be confiscated without compensation; (e) that there is no intention to interfere with existing contractual rights; (f) that there is no intention to interfere with personalized liberty; (g) that any person to whom judicial or quasi-judicial power is given will exercise such power in accordance with the rules of natural judge; (h) that the statute is not intended to derogate from the requirements of supranational law. Any of these presumptions may be overruled by the precise words of the statute. Private Acts (but not public Acts) always have a preamble which sets out the objects of the legislation. Preambles can on occasion be of considerable avail to the courts in interpreting the Acts.\r\n'